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INTRODUCTION' 
I first began research on the late Eastern Han (25-
220 AD) philosopher Xu Gan }fj'~'f (170-217) in 1983. The 
initial result of this work was an annotated translation 
of his Zhong lun 
Zhong lun is 
...!? J"~ Discourse That Hits the MarJc. 1 I {1\-~jJ I 
a collection of essays that are 
predominantly concerned with philosophical questions. As 
a whole, the text can be best described as an enquiry 
into the causes of political and social breakdown and the 
presentation of various ethical and political remedies. 
Much of Xu Gan 1 s argumentation appeals to the authority 
of traditional Confucian ethics; indeed the work is 
classified under ru jia1~ 1"j( in all bibliographical lists 
of the standard histories, except for that of Song shi 
;$' f-, where it is listed among miscellaneous writers. 
Even though in some of the twenty-two pian2 ~ that 
comprise Zhong lun a range of influences may be discerned 
that derive from non-Confucian sources, for a Han dynasty 
{206 BC-220 AD) writing it is remarkably free of the 
overt eclecticism that characterizes many writings of 
that period. And, like xun Yue 1 s ~ 'rJt (148-209) Shen Jian 
'f ~; , which also dates from the end of the Eastern Han 
period, Xu Gan's Zhong lun evidences a creative and 
polemical Confucian spirit that was continued in such 
T ANU Masters thesis, 1986. 2 For bibliographical details and history of the Zhong 
lun text, see Appendix A. 
post-Han writings as Wang Su's j.. ~ 
Zi Jt1;J and Fu Xuan's 1~ i (217-278) 
(195-256) 
Fu Zi 1~ J 
2 
Kong Cong 
3 
The most important concept employed in Zhong lun is 
the 'name and actuality' (ming shi)dytl dichotomy and my 
purpose in this thesis is to elucidate Xu Gan' s concept 
of the name and actuality relationship and its 
philosophical and social background. Xu Gan saw the name 
and actuality relationship to be of fundamental 
importance because he believed that the correspondence 
between name and actuality ultimately affected the 
harmonious integration of the realm of man with the rest 
of the cosmos of which man was a part. For Xu Gan the 
bond between name and actuality was not something to be 
prescribed by convention or artificially determined by 
man because, just like the flowering of plants in spring 
or the regular cycle of the four seasons, it is part of 
the cosmic order. And if that bond is broken or 
artificially prescribed, the repercussions were seen to 
affect not only socio-political order, but even the moral 
order, leading Xu Gan to address questions such as 
whether the practice of moral conduct was of any 
practical worth, and what bearing humane behaviour had on 
a man's longevity. 
My purpose in presenting the philosophical and 
social background is to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of Xu Gan's concept of the ~~me and 
3 For studies of these three works, see Chen Chi-yun, 
Hsiin Yiieh and the Mind of Late Han China, Yoav Ariel, 
K 'ung-Ts 'ung-Tzu: The K 'ung Family Masters' Anthology, 
and Jordan D. Paper, The Fu Tzu: A Post-Han Confucian 
Text. 
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actuality relationship, by seeing it in relief against 
the backdrop of a tradition of ming shi discourse, and 
also to determine what were the more immediate influences 
that prompted Xu Gan to discuss the name and actuality 
relationship. As Maurice Mandlebaum writes: 
It is only when we view philosophic thought 
both in terms of its own tradition, and in 
terms of influences focussed upon it 
because of the circumstances of the 
philosopher's life and times, that we can 
see a particular philosopher's work in 
proper perspective: as a distinctive 
philosophic achievement which also belongs 
within the general intellectual history of 
the period.4 
The thesis is comprised of eight chapters divided 
into four parts: 
Part I: Chapter 1. 
Part II: Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
Part III: Chapters 6 and 7. 
Part IV: Chapter 8. 
Each part broadly addresses a particular question: 'What 
was Xu Gan's concept of the ming shi relationship?', 'How 
does it relate to earlier views of ming shi?', 'What 
background social and intellectual factors prompted Xu 
Gan to discuss the ming shi relationship?' and 'What 
bearing did his concept of the ming shi relationship have 
on other thinking in Zhong lun?' 
Part I - In this first part, comprising only one but 
the longest chapter of the thesis, I develop my 
interpretation of Xu Gan's concept of the proper 
relationship that should obtain between name and 
~aurice Mandlebaum, "The History of Ideas, 
History, and the History of Philosophy", 
Theory, 4.3 (1965), Beiheft 5, 62. 
Intellectual 
History and 
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actuality. I stress that it is my interpretation because 
in writing Zhong lun it was certainly not Xu Gan's 
intention to set forth a systematic account of the body 
of beliefs and premisses that informed his concept of the 
name and actuality relationship. Thus, insofar as my 
interpretation is a reconstruction of beliefs and 
premisses which all too often lie only partially revealed 
in the various essays that comprise Zhong lun, of 
necessity it is hypothetical. (It is, of course, this 
very reconstruction that makes the whole enterprise a 
challenge.) 
In Chapter l, I argue that Xu Gan understood shi to 
mean 'a state of development in an entity or state of 
affairs by virtue of which that entity or state of 
affairs is what it is'. To distinguish this sense of shi 
from its other sense as 'particular object', I t~anslate 
it as 'actuality'. I also argue that, as a corollary 
this view, Xu Gan subscribed to a_ c.Qv-rJ2.lcJ\ (l.(ii;v theory 
to 
of 
naming. By a CrOIFit~aftv.e,.: theory of naming I mean the 
view that there is a proper or correct C,cwv-..e-(,>t:fW#l-
between a given name and a given actuality, determined, 
variously, by what has been ordained by 'Heaven' (tianj:J 
or by :Vhf"t is naturally so/so of itself' (zi ran~~{). A 
' '' _1'.0!1~11'~1!/"" theory of naming is to be distinguished from 
a nominalist theory of naming, the latter being the view 
that it is man who arbitrarily or conventi:mally 
determines which ming 
there is no proper or 
should be applied to 
correct {,ov-v-4J-i'Dh. 
which shi; 
between a 
given ming and a given shi other than what has been 
artificially determined by 
5 
,p 
man. !1 I then proceed to show 
n 
that for Xu Gan, the proper relationship between names 
and actualities is one where there is accord between them 
such that names faithfully represent actualities and 
actualities give names their meaning and significance. 
When name and actuality are in accord they form a whole 
where each partner relies on the other such that without 
names, actualities would not be manifest and without 
actualities, there would be nothing to be manifest as 
names. I argue that the conceptual model which best 
represents this relationship is the substance-function 
(ti yong ;Jf 1f] ) polarity. In the final section of this 
chapter, I examine the Potency (de {~ )-reputation 
relationship, the single most important name and 
actuality relationship discussed by Xu Gan in Zhong lun. 
Part II - This is a group of background studies of 
the ming shi dichotomy in the classical period of Chinese 
philosophy - approximately 500 BC to 150 BC. During the 
classical period, discussion of ming and shi was common 
to all the major schools of thought: the Confucians, the 
Legalists, the School of Names, the Daoists, and the 
Mohists. Nevertheless, giveri that my purpose is not to 
write a proper history of the ming shi dichotomy - a huge 
topic warranting a study in its own right - of necessity 
I have had to be selective in choosing which thinkers and 
which .. ritings are most germane to my twofold purpose of: 
i. providing a philosophical backdrop against which my 
interpretation of Xu Gan's concept of name and actuality 
is given depth and perspective, thereby enhancing its 
6 
definition; ii. determining the extent to which Xu Gan's 
concept of the name and actuality relationship is 
original or derivative. To some extent, the task of 
selection has been made easier because the only School of 
Names writing dealing specifically with the subject of 
ming and shi is no longer extant - the essay entitled 
"Ming shi 11 ~ 1 in the received Gongsun Long Zi 't.' ij. Jt ~ was 
forged sometime between 300 and 600 AD. 5 And despite Sima 
Tan's (d. 110 BC) praise of this school for 
"correcting the relationship between names and objects", 6 
School of Names writings are characterized by an extreme 
nominalism where ad hoc and circumscribed senses of words 
(ming), paradoxes and specious logic are used for the 
purposes of entertainment and winning in disputation. 7 
For School of Names philosophers, it is ming, not shi, 
that are important; whether or not a name does il'. fact 
correspond with some object or state of affairs was not a 
primary consideration. Daoist writings present an even 
more extremist nominalism: the distinctions represented 
by ming are held to be determined on the basis of nothing 
more than arbitrary, subjective, relative and 
conventional standard~ 
Worse than this, m.J.ng 
5 See A.C. Graham, "The Composition of the Gongsuen Long 
Izyy", Asia Major, n.s. 5.2 (1956). 
Shi ji, 130.3289. Presumably he means that the subtle 
semantic distinctions employed by School of N<~.mes 
thinkers in disputation forced their opponents to take 
more care in defining their terms. It is also possible 
that in making these comments, Sima Tan specifically had 
;n mind Gongsun Long's "Ming shi" essay. 
See, for example, my discussion of the 'hard and white 1 
sophism in, "The Chien-pai Sophism - Alive and Well", 
Philosophy East and West, 39.1 (January, 1989), 75-81. 
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actually perpetuate false dichotomies by creating the 
illusion that distinctions exist. 8 Because the focus of 
these views on ming is extremist, in Part II I have 
chosen to examine the writings of thinkers, both 
nominalist and c.ov-r~-\'i,;~ whose views provide more 
insight into the notion of a name and actuality 
relationship. 
Chapter 2 is an interpretation of Confucius' zheng 
ming or correction of names programme, the seminal 
statement in early Chinese thought of the socio-political 
role that ming are perceived to play. Confucius' zheng 
ming programme is also the earliest example of a nominal 
prescriptivist philosophy in classical Chinese thought. I 
define nominal prescriptivism as the view that ming can 
and should be used to prescribe shi. Although Confucius 
does not employ the word shi in those passages that best 
exemplify his zheng ming thinking, it is evident that he 
did believe that ming did (or should) represent what 
later writers used the word shi to refer to: entities and 
states of affairs. His concern with the normative and 
prescriptive function of ming was to be reiterated and 
refined in a number of later writings on ming and shi. 
Chapter 3 is a study of ming and shi in the Neo 
1~ •-Mohist summa and the Xun Zi ~ ~ essay, "On the Correct 
Use of Names" ("Zheng ming" j.. /><J). I argue that the word 
shi in ti.ese writings is to be understood as 'particular 
object' and to distinguish it from its other meaning of 
'actuality' I translate it as 'object'. I also argue that 
8 This is particularly so in Zhuang Zi's ~~ .f (second half 
fourth-early third century BC) writings. ~ee Appendix B. 
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these writings advance the view that ming could and 
should be used to prescribe shi, and that in each case 
this view is premissed on a nominalist theory of naming. 
The nominalist theories of naming that are found in these 
writings stand out as being the most fully developed in 
classical Chinese thought. 
Chapter 4 is a study of the Legalist administrative 
formula of 'matching word and deed' (xing ming 11-'J ~). I 
argue that xing ming is a unique application, rich in 
nuance, of the ming shi dichotomy to Legalist philosophy 
of statecraft. While xing ming is a further example of 
nominal prescriptivist thinking, its particular relevance 
to Xu Gan's thought is Han Fei's f~~\<:(d. 233 BC) 
presentation of xing and ming in a substance-function 
relationship. In discussions of ming shi before Han Fei 
there is no evidence to suggest that ming and shi are 
amenable to a substance-function interpretation. 
Chapter 5 is a study of what I identify to be the 
earliest examples of essentialist theories of naming in 
early Chinese thought. The main writings studied are the 
"X in shu shang" 11;.• :<1.1' j::: , "Xin shu xia" r~·.ffj'f and "Bai xin" 
1J r\'.' pian of Guan Zi 1f:} , and the "Shen cha ming hao•' 
~1 fj jk !fft pian of Dong Zhongshu's 1 -1'f ff (c.l79-c. l04i 
Chun qiu fan lu ~--it J~ I argue that in these 
writings, for the first time we find the word shi being 
used to mean 'that by virtue of which an entity is wh.,.t 
it is' and that Xu Gan's theory of naming and his concept 
of shi share a great deal in common with the ideas 
adumbrated in these writings. 
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Part III - The purpose of Part III is to establish 
that, in particular, two aspects of Eastern Han society 
can be seen to have influenced Xu Gan' s belief that when 
the conditions for accord between names and actualities 
do not prevail, the bond between names and actualities 
becomes dislocated, leaving actualities unable to be 
properly expressed and names being used to represent 
actualities which did not exist. Xu Gan sees this changed 
name-actuality relationship as a fundamental-peripheral 
(ben mo ;¥J) relationship. 
Chapter 6 is a study of the bearing that the 
unbridled pursuit of reputation in Eastern Han society 
had on Xu Gan's understanding of what.happens to the name 
and actuality relationship when name and actuality are 
seen to be in disaccord. I show how ming j iao 
~t~ e~couraged men to pursue personal reputation so that 
' ' I . 
they might secure office. 
the scholar gentry (shi ..j:" 
The result of this was that 
class came to attach undue 
importance to ming and less and less importance to shi. 
Chapter 7 is a study of the bearing of Eastern Han 
classical scholarship on Xu Gan' s understanding of what 
happens to the name and actuality relationship when name 
and actualh:y are seen to be in disaccord. I begin by 
describing the methodological characteristics of the two 
rival schools of classical scholarship in the Eastern 
Han: the Oid Text School and the New Text School and then 
proceed to investigate Xu Gan's objections to that 
methodology. I argue that classical scholarship in the 
Eastern Han was concerned more with the written word and 
10 
glossing than it was with the elucidation of the 
teachings of the classical texts and, as with ming jiao, 
this development can be seen to have influenced Xu Gan's 
view that when the conditions for the proper relationship 
between name and actuality no longer prevail, name and 
actuality fall into a fundamental-peripheral 
relationship. 
Part IV - In Chapter 8, I examine what for Xu Gan 
were the cosmological-cum-ethical implications of name 
and actuality being in accord and disaccord. The 
rationale for dealing with this topic last of all is that 
it builds on an understanding of accord and disaccord 
developed in Parts I and III. Xu Gan' s position on two 
major contemporary philosophical questions are examined: 
i. the relationship between a man 1 s practice of 
humaneness and the length of his life; and ii. the 
relationship between a man's moral nature and his innate 
ability. 
